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Article 7

Michigan's Attempt at Curbing Drunk Drivers
Under The Fourth Amendment:
The Constitutionality of Sobriety Checkpoints
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court recently expanded the
doctrine of warrantless searches. 1 The area of warrantless
searches is confusing and often irrationaV and the Court's
decision in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz only
adds to the tangled web of confusion. In referring to this
area, Justice Powell stated that the Court "cannot agree
even on what it has held previously, let alone on how these
cases should be decided." 3 The Sitz case is no exception.
This Note discusses how the Court misapplied the balancing test established in Brown v. Texas 4 by undervaluing
the nature of the intrusion and by exaggerating the law enforcement need to use sobriety checkpoints to prevent drunk
driving. 5 This Note does not deny the immense social costs
drunk drivers cause, nor does it slight the government's
effort to prevent the tragic loss of lives on our public highways. This Note does, however, agree with Justice Stevens
conclusion that the Sitz decision is "driven by nothing more
than symbolic state action-an insufficient justification for
an otherwise unreasonable program of random seizures."6
The Court set its sights on the wrong symbol-"the illusory
prospect of punishing countless intoxicated motorists"-when
the focus should have been on privacy rights. 7
II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .''8 Prior to
1.
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990).
2.
A majority of the Supreme Court refers to the law of vehicle searches as
"this troubled area." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817 (1982).
Robbins v. California 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring), over3.
ruled, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
4.
443 U.S. 47 (1979).
!'i.
Sobriety checkpoints are stops by patrol officers to detect individuals that
are drinking and driving.
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, ??? (1990) (Stevens, J.,
6.
dissenting).
7.
Id.
R.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

148

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 6

1968, the Supreme Court considered arrests and seizures to
be synonymous under the Fourth Amendment, but that has
since changed. 9 The difference between an arrest and a
seizure now depends upon the scope of the intrusion. 10 Another difference is that an arrest or a seizure having the
essential attributes of a formal arrest must always be based
upon probable cause, 11 whereas some seizures, like a Terry
stop, 12 require a lesser standard. 13 The reasonableness of
a seizure is based upon whether probable cause exists. 14
The Court allows seizures of persons so long as only a
brief detention is involved. 15 In Brown, the Court enunciated a balancing test to govern such searches. The Brown
Court refined the prior tests by weighing the gravity of the
public concern served by the seizure and the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest against the
severity of the interference with individual liberty. 16 The
objective standard of probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
normally used in evaluating the constitutionality of any
stop, only gives way to the balancing test under special
circumstances. 17 In National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, the Court stated that special circumstances arise
when the "intrusion serves special government needs, beyond
the normal needs of law enforcement . . . ."H1
9.
10.

Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-210 (1979).
See e.g., United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429, 435-36 (5th Cir. 1980).
11.
See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981).
"[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
12.
manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Terry v. Ohio, 392
u.s. 1, 22 (1968).
See Id.
13.
14.
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963).
Hi.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
16.
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). The Court emphasized that a
central concern in the balancing test is that the "privacy is not subject to arbitrary
invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field." Id.
17.
See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 6fi6, 665
(1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
18.
Von Raab, 4R9 U.S. at 665. Immigration checkpoints are necessary to discover illegal aliens. Smuggling illegal aliens does not impair the motorist's driving
ability, but if a motorist is intoxicated his driving ability will be impaired. An
intoxicated motorist can often be identified by his driving maneuvers, whereas a
motorist carrying illegal aliens most likely cannot he spotted by observing driving
patterns because he or she shows no sign of carrying illegal aliens. This would he
an example of a special governmental need, beyond the normal needs of law
enforcement. Without these permanent checkpoints, the government would he
severely hampered in its enforcement.
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Before Sitz, three important cases, involving investigatory stops of motorists, employed a balancing test to determine whether the suspicionless stop of a vehicle was reasonable. The cases are United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 19
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 20 and Delaware v.
Prouse. 21
The first two cases-Brignoni-Ponce and MartinezFuerte-were border patrol cases. These two cases contrasted
the differences between roving patrols 22 and permanent
checkpoints. In both cases, the Court examined vehicle stops
near the Mexican/United States border where agents questioned occupants about their citizenship and immigration
status. In the first case, the Court determined that roving
patrol stops by officers need to be based upon reasonable,
articulable suspicion. 23 The Court, in the second case, stated that stops at permanent checkpoints are reasonable even
though based upon no individualized suspicion. 24 In the
third case, Prouse, the Court determined that random stops
to check licenses and vehicle registration were more comparable to roving patrol stops by the border patrol than to
permanent checkpoints. 25 The Court found that the physical
and psychological intrusions caused by random stops to
check documents are the same as roving patrol stops. 26

III. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz
A. Facts
Petitioners, the Michigan Department of State Police
and its Director, organized a sobriety checkpoint pilot program in 1986. 27 In February of the same year, the Director
appointed a Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee, composed of representatives of the state police, local law enforcement, prosecuting attorneys, and the University of Mic19.
422 u.s. 873 (1975).
20.
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
21.
440 u.s. 648 (1979).
22.
Roving patrols are random stops of motorists in the absence of specific
articulated facts which justify the stop by indicating a reasonable suspicion. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 651 (1979).
23.
Bngnoni-Punce, 422 U.S. at 881, 883.
24.
Martinez-Fuerte, 421-l U.S. at 562.
25.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657.
26.
Id.
27.
Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 429 N.W.2d lHO, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 19R8).
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higan Transportation Research Committee. 28 The committee
submitted guidelines for implementation and operation of
the program. Included in the guidelines were procedures
governing "site selection, publicity, and operation of the
checkpoint which included briefing, scheduling, safety considerations, motorist contact, staffing, and assignment of duties."29
When the checkpoints were set up, all vehicles were to
be stopped upon reaching the checkpoint and the drivers
"examined for signs of intoxication."30 If the officer found
evidence of intoxication, the officer would direct the driver
to another location at the checkpoint for further examination.:n If the more thorough examination showed the driver
to be intoxicated, the officer would arrest the individual. 32
If the driver was not found to be intoxicated at either stage
of the examination, the driver would be released. 33
Prior to the litigation, only one checkpoint operation had
been conducted in Michigan. During the operation of the
checkpoint, wherein 126 vehicles passed through in a one
hour and fifteen minute time period, only two people were
arrested.M Each vehicle passing through the checkpoint
was delayed an average of 25 seconds.:l 5
The day before operation of the first checkpoint, Sitz
and others filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief from subjection to sobriety
checkpoints. 36 Michigan agreed to suspend use of checkpoints pending the outcome in court. The trial court held
the Michigan sobriety checkpoint to be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 37 On appeal, the Michigan
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision finding
the roadblocks unconstitutional seizures under both the

28.
29.

ao.
:31.
:32.

aa.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

:l4.
:Hi.
"Two drivers were detained for field sobriety testing, and one of the two
was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A third driver who druve
through without stopping was pulled over by an officer in an observation vehicle
and arrested for driving under the influence." Sitz, 496 U.S. at ???.
:36.
Id.

:n

Id.
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United States and Michigan Constitutions. 38 The Michigan
Supreme Court denied Respondents' Application for Leave to
Appeal, so they filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The
United States Supreme Court did not consider whether the
checkpoints violated the Michigan Constitution, but rather
reversed by holding that the Michigan courts misapplied the
Brown test. 39

B.

The Majority's Application of the Brown Test

The Brown test weighs the gravity of the public concern
served by the seizure and the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest against the severity of the interference with individual liberty. 40

1. The state's interest in curbing drunk drivers on public
highways
Most people agree that drunk driving is a serious problem in the United States and that a state has an important
interest in eliminating drunk driving. Statistics show that
drunk drivers cause a death toll of over 25,000 and nearly
one million personal injuries annually. 41 Drunk drivers also
cause more than five billion dollars in property damage per
year. 42 "For decades the Court has 'repeatedly lamented the
tragedy."'43

2. Effectiveness of the stop
In evaluating the last element of the Brown test, the
Court held that the Michigan Court of Appeals erred in
their evaluation of the effectiveness of the stops. 44 The
Court stated that this requirement in Brown "was not
meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the
courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative

88.

89.

40.

ld.
lei.
Brown, 44:1 U.S. at .51.
4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH

41.
AMENDMENT

42.

4:1.

AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH

§ 10.8(d), p. 71 (HJ87).

lei.
Sitz, 496 U.S. at ??? (quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 4.59 U.S. 558, 558

(198:3)).
44.
ld.
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law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with
a serious public danger." 45 Rather, the Court gave great
deference to the elected officials to choose among the alternatives.

3.

The level of intrusion on the public's rights

While the Court agreed that there is an important state
interest in curbing drunk driving, the Court's decision appears to view the individual's interest as very minimal. 46
The Court evaluated the magnitude of the intrusion on
individual's rights by considering two
different
47
standards-objective and subjective. Objective intrusion is
measured by the duration of the stop. 48 In Sitz, the duration of the stops was an average of 25 seconds. According to
the Court, the stops were but a minimal intrusion according
to the objective standard.
Subjective intrusion is measured according to the perception of the individual drivers. 49 Some intrusions can generate concern, and even fear on the part of some drivers. 50
The Court found the intrusion to be less than that generated by a roving patrol because the driver could see others
being pulled over. 51

C. In an Effort to Make the Roads Safer, the Court Erred
in Its Application of Brown
When officers detain a person for identification or questioning, they perform a seizure of the person subject to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 52 The Fourth
Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including
seizures that involve only brief detention. 53 When the government intentionally terminates freedom of movement, a
seizure, albeit brief, results. 54 The reasonableness of sei-

45.
46.
47.
48.
4!!.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
Id.
ld.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Davis v. Mississippi, 894 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1, 16·19

50.
51.
52.
58.
(1961:1).
54.
Brower v. County of Inyo, 4H9 U.S. fi98, fi97 (19H9).
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zures depends upon balancing the interest of the public with
the individual's right to be free from arbitrary interference
by law enforcement officials. 55

1.

The Brown court's balancing test

In Brown, the officers observed two individuals in an
alley. 56 Because the officers believed the situation to be
suspicious and one of the individuals had never been seen
by the officers, the officers stopped him. 57 The individual
was asked to identify himself and to explain what he was
doing in the area. Mter refusing to identify himself, the police arrested the individual according to a Texas statute. 58
Following the arrest, the officers searched the individual but
found nothing. A Texas court convicted the individual for
refusing to give his name to the police officer. 59
The officers, in support of their detention of the individual, stated that the area is frequented by drug users and
is a high crime area. 60 They also stated that it is unusual
for people to be in alleys. 61 Because of these factors, the
officers detained the individual under a Texas statute which
allows an officer to obtain the identity of an individual. The
statute is designed to advance a compelling social
objective-prevention of crime. 62
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
ruling, finding it an unconstitutional seizure. The Court
held that, when a seizure is less intrusive than a traditional arrest, the lower courts must balance between the public
interest and the individual's right to personal security free
from arbitrary interference by the state. 63 While balancing,
courts must also consider how the seizure advances the
public's interest. 64 The Court went on to state that a sei-

55.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878.
56.
Brown v. Texas, 44::1 U.S. 47, 48 (1979).
57.
!d. at 49.
58.
!d. (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN., Tit. 8, § 38.02 (a) (West 1974) makes it a
criminal act for a person to refuse to give his name and address to an officer "who
has lawfully stopped him and requested the information.").
59.
!d. at 50.
60.
!d. at 49.
61.
!d. at 52.
62.
!d.
6::1.
!d., at 50.
!d. at 51.
64.
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zure, without probable cause, "must be carried out pursuant
to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers."65 The Texas statute failed
this test.
a. Public concern over the problem of drunk
driving. The first prong of the Brown test looks at the
gravity of the public concern. 66 Drunk driving causes many
deaths on the highways. However, significant progress has
been made in reducing the number of alcohol related highway fatalities and injuries. For example, in 1988 there were
18,501 traffic fatalities involving legally intoxicated persons.
The number of legally intoxicated drivers killed in these
crashes was 10,210, leaving 8,291 non-drivers killed in the
accidents. "The portion of fatally injured drivers who were
legally intoxicated dropped from 43.8% in 1982 to 37.5% in
1988."67 The number of intoxicated drivers involved in fatal
accidents has dropped in all age groups. 68 All of these improvements69 have been achieved without checkpoints or
with minimal use of checkpoints.
b. The degree to which se~zures advance public
interest. The second element of the test is the degree to
which seizures advance the public interest. 70 This element
of the Brown test was the central focus of the lower courts
in Sitz. Justice Stevens stated in his dissent that courts
need to look at the net benefits of the program, for example, the long-term effects and the costs of obtaining the
arrests, instead of always looking at the gross receipts,

65.
ld.
66.
Id.
67.
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM 1988 6 (Dec. 1989). "The less
alcohol, the less likely there will be an injury or fatality. Further, fatally injured
drivers show higher alcohol levels than surviving drivers in all types of crashes
and time periods." Brief of Amicus Curiae, MADD at 8, Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (No. ????) (favoring petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Michigan Court of Appeals) (citing NATIONAL CENTER OF STATISTICS AND
ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION/NATIONAL HH:HWAY THAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, ''DRUNK DRIVING FACTS" (Date '??)).
68.
Id.
69.
"[T]he National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimates that an
additional 5,000 lives per year would he saved if the 21 States without mandatory
safety belt usage laws were to enact such legislation-even though only fiO% of motorists obey such laws." Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, ???
n.2 (1990).
Brown, 448 U.S. at 47.
70.
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initial number of arrests. 71 If a business were to look only
at gross receipts, all businesses would appear profitable.
Most state decisions viewed in this light would also look
advantageous. Only by comparing expenses to returns can a
true measurement of a program's success be obtained.
From the outset of the program, Michigan's justification
for the checkpoints was their deterrent effect, rather than
the number of arrests facilitated. 72 Because of the extensive publicity initially given to Michigan's program, checkpoints may have some short-term effect on drunk driving
statistics. However, long-term effectiveness of the program
will only be achieved if the public perceives an increased
risk of being arrested. 73 Once the public learns that there
is only a slight risk of being arrested, any deterrent effect
will end. 74 The deterrent effect of the checkpoints will also
decrease as the media coverage is reduced, and as people
realize that they can avoid the checkpoints by turning
around. Short-term gains are no justification for an intrusion into an individual's rights.
The Michigan checkpoint program was patterned after a
program used in Maryland. 75 Maryland's program illustrates the uselessness of sobriety checkpoints. Of the 125 checkpoints conducted with 41,000 motorists passing through, the
state arrested only 143 persons-only .3% of drivers
stopped. 76 This rate is even less than the rate achieved in
Michigan's first checkpoint-1.5%. 77 The figures for other
states are roughly comparable to Michigan and Maryland. 78

71.
Sitz, 496 U.S. at ??? (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72.
Respondent's Brief at 25, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990) (No. 88-1897).
73.
ld.
74.
The Michigan trial court concluded:
[S]obriety checkpoints cannot be expected to achieve any significant level
of apprehending drunk drivers. This fmding, in the Court's opinion, essentially undermines the whole theoretical basis for concluding that checkpoints can be effective in deterring drunk drivers . . . . Once the public
perceives the truth about the low chance of a drunk driver actually being
apprehended in a sobriety checkpoint, it cannot reasonably be supposed
that those who are inclined to drink and drive will perceive a sobriety
checkpoint as a significant threat to their being arrested.
Respondent's Brief at 26-27, Sitz (No. 88-1897).
75.
Sitz, 496 U.S. at '???.
76.
ld.
77.
Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
78.
See, e.g., Ekstrom v. Justice Ct., 663 P.2d 992, 993 (Ariz. 1983) (5,763 cars
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Checkpoints are, at best, simply unnecessary in the
fight against drunk driving. The sheriffs of a number of
counties testified that the most efficient use of police resources in checking the evil of drunk driving was not
checkpoints but patrol cars. 79 "This testimony was corroborated by witnesses from the Michigan State Police, who
testified that state police officers receive considerable training in detecting drunk driving characteristics and are highly
skilled in detecting drunk drivers."8 ° Checkpoints do not
decrease drunk driving, but result in decreased manpower to
be used in normal patrolling for drunk drivers. 81
Even with the small number of resulting arrests, some
argue, as the Court did implicitly, that it is better than
none at all. 82 These advocates do not take into account the
number of officers that checkpoints draw away from those
who might have been on patrol. 83 While the checkpoints
may result in roughly a 1% arrest rate, there is no evidence
that checkpoints are more effective at detecting and arresting drunk drivers. Supporters of checkpoints cannot even
document a checkpoint's deterrent effect on drunk drivers.
Yet, supporters advocate a program that infringes upon an
individual's constitutional rights while patrolling does not. 84
The Guidelines authored by the Michigan Police Department state that only one sobriety roadblock will be in operation on any given night. Extensive, advance publicity will
be given in the target county. 85 Because of the heavy constopped, 14 arrests); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1803 (Cal. 1987) (283
vehicles screened, no arrests); State v. Garcia, 481 N.E.2d 148, 150 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 488 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Mass. 1985) (503 cars
stopped, eight arrests).
79.
Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 184; Respondent's Brief at 18-19, Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (No. 88-1897) (Brief in Opposition to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari).
Respondent's Brief at 19, Sitz (No. 88-1897).
80.
81.
According to the 1987 Michigan Drunk Driving Audit Report, current Jaw
enforcement techniques apprehend approximately 75% of drunk drivers. Brief of
Amicus Curiae, MADD at 11-12, Sitz (No. ????) (citing 1987 Michigan Drunk Driving Audit Report).
82.
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, ???.
8:3.
Sitz, 429 N.W.2d 180. See e.g., State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174, 1187 (Kan.
1983) (140 police hours consumed in obtaining only 15 arrests); Commonwealth v.
Trumble, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1104-5 (503 cars stopped, eight arrests, 13 participating
officers).
84.
An officer on patrol can only pull over a driver if the officer has probable
cause that the driver is driving under the influence.
85.
Brief for the Respondent at 29, Michigan Dep't State Police v. Sitz, 496
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centration of officers needed to man a checkpoint, police
resources will be reduced elsewhere. This could suggest to
drivers in other counties that their chances of being detected have been reduced. Thus, checkpoint programs might
increase the number of drunk drivers because of the large
number of officers used at the checkpoints. This is especially
true if drunk drivers are allowed to bypass the checkpoint
upon seeing it ahead of them. 86
Maryland also conducted a study to see if the number
of accidents and fatalities decreased because of the deterrent
effect of checkpoints. 87 The study compared traffic accidents
in a county using checkpoints with accidents occurring in a
county (control county) without checkpoints. 88 The results
showed that accidents in the checkpoint county decreased by
10%, while decreasing by 11% in the control county. Fatal
accidents in the control county decreased from sixteen to
three while in the checkpoint county fatal accidents actually
doubled from the prior year. 89 Besides fewer arrests for
drunk driving, 90 the checkpoints do not show any decrease
in the problem that the majority says is of such great concern to the public-alcohol related traffic accidents. The
decrease in the number of accidents and the number of
fatalities are the result of other factors, not drunk driving
checkpoints. 91
The Court has effectively eliminated this step, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, by
stating that it is not the Court's responsibility to second
guess which law enforcement techniques a state uses. 92
The Court believes this should be left to the political process.
While the Court should give some deference to the
states, complete deference is not wise. Complete deference to
the state would result in inefficient law enforcement techniques. The effectiveness requirement in the Brown test

U.S. 444 (1990) (No. 88-1897).
86.
Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 184-185.
!d. at 184.
87.
!d.
88.
89.
!d.
90.
Ann M. Overbeck, A Sobering Look at the Constitutionality Of DUI Roadblocks, 54 CIN. L. REV. 579, 593 n.llO (1985).
91.
See e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at ??? n.2.
92.
!d. at ???.
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provides a check on inefficient law enforcement techniques.
The reasoning applied by the Court allows states to intrude
into an individual's rights while trying to cure other societal
problems. In 1986, about 19,257 murders and non-negligent
manslaughters occurred. 93 The majority of these deaths
were caused by firearms and knives. States have an interest
in decreasing these numbers, especially when they are
greater than the number of innocent individuals killed on
the public highways. 94 Under the Sitz analysis, the state
could stop individuals in a high crime area and at their
discretion question the individual.
As mentioned earlier, in Brown, the area where the
appellant was stopped had a high incidence of drug traffic
and the police had never seen the appellant in the area
before. After refusing to identify himself, the police arrested
the appellant and he was convicted of refusing to give his
name to a police officer. The purpose of the statute was to
prevent crime and the state believed that this was an effective means. The Supreme Court found this application of
the Texas law unconstitutional because the law allowed for
seizures by officers without reasonable suspicion. 95 This
Court might have reached a different result, if instead of
random stops of individuals, the police had stopped all people in the area. The state could have argued that the individual was in a high crime area and that they were trying
to stop the passage of drugs within the community. By
questioning a person as to his purpose in the area, the
officer was enforcing the state interest of keeping out the
unwanted drug dealers. This type of program would be as
effective as sobriety checkpoints and possibly have greater
deterrence than a sobriety checkpoint. When the state can
show an important state interest, the Court appears willing
to grant complete deference to the state legislature, if the
Court considers the intrusion minimal. By giving great deference to the state legislatures, the Court implicitly eradicated the effectiveness prong of the Brown test. 96
9:3.
Sitz, 4~6 U.S. at ?'?? n.l7.
94.
Out of lH,fiOl alcohol related traffic fatalities, 10,210 of the fatalities were
the legally intoxicated. Only 8,291 of those fatalities wore nonintuxicated individuals. This also doesn't take into account the number of accidents caused hy the
nonintoxicated driver. Id. This is far fewer than the number of innocent people
murdered and killed hy firearms each year.
~fi.
Brown, 44:1 U.S. 47, 48-4~ (1~79).
96.
The public also has an interest in alleviating the use of drugs because of
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c. The severity of the interference with individual liberty.
Individual suspicion has been the core component of Fourth
Amendment protection against arbitrary government action.97 The state has at its disposal a large array of law enforcement weapons, yet the individual must rely upon the
benevolence of the state or the courts to ensure that their
rights are not trampled. By allowing cars to be stopped to
prevent drunk driving, the Court subjects the public to
potentially arbitrary harassment by police officers. Complete
deference to the state does not fit within the framework of
the Constitution. 98
The determination of the extent of the intrusion usually
is divided into two components, the subjective and the objective nature of the intrusion. 99 Based upon the short
amount of time that each car is required to stop, the trial
court concluded that the objective intrusion was minimal. In
evaluating the intrusiveness of the seizure, the Court must
take into account the overall impact on legitimate traffic. 1oo
While considering the initial stop, the Court failed to
truly consider the intrusiveness of the stop. The intrusiveness of a checkpoint goes significantly beyond what is
contained in a single, brief stop. If suspicionless stops are
allowed, a number of results will necessarily follow which
involve a substantial intrusion. First, after the automobile is
stopped at the checkpoint, the officer may compel the occupants of the car to get out. 101 Second, the occupants could
be subjected to pat-down searches if an officer reasonably
suspects that the person detained might be dangerous. 102

the social harms they cause. Currently the government has appointed what is
referred to as a "Drug Czar" to wage America's battle against drugs. Because of
the high publicity of this public concern, the Court, according to its holding, would
grant great deference to the state and federal government in enacting enforcement
techniques.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979).
97.
98.
The trial court discussed at length the inherent ineffectiveness of drunk
driving checkpoints in terms of both arrests and deterrence. Only after the court
concluded that roadblocks were ineffective in meeting any of the state's express
and implicit goals did the trial court turn to analyzing other forms of law enforcement. Deference should not be given to a state program that cannot and will not
accomplish its purposes, and is extremely expensive to operate.
99.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-59 (1976).
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975).
100.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
101.
102.
!d. at 111-12.
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Third, the officer could require the driver to produce his license or other vehicle documents. 103 If the occupant has to
go to the glove compartment to get the documents, the
officer will be able to view what is inside the glove compartment.104
By requiring the officers to stop all cars, the program
does limit the officer's discretion in choosing whom to subject to the initial stop. However, the discretion of the officer
as to who is detained is unlimited. The officer could base
his decision on a ruddy complexion, an unbuttoned shirt, or
a speech impediment. This may be all that is needed to
detain an individual. 105
Of the 126 drivers who passed through the first checkpoint, only two were detained for further examination and
questioning. One of those drivers was arrested. Thus, after
the initial stop, the motorist can, at the discretion of the
officer, be subject to another round of questioning and testing. Checkpoints are more intrusive than one is initially
lead to believe.
Because· of police officer discretion, a large number of
innocent drivers are subject to very intense scrutiny. A
Maryland study indicated that drivers subject to full-fledged
investigations at a checkpoint are most likely to be completely innocent of drunk driving charges. 106 For example,
a study conducted in North Carolina discovered that of the
940 individuals detained for further questioning, only 290
were arrested for drunk driving. A Delaware study produced
similar results-only 231 individuals were arrested of the
701 individuals detained. 107 The Court in evaluating the
intrusion failed to take this into consideration.
Despite the Court's assurance, this type of checkpoint is
similar to the roving patrol struck down by the Court in
Brignoni-Ponce because of its intrusion upon the public's
Fourth Amendment rights. 108 As with roving patrols, fear
and anxiety are an understandable reaction. First, the

108.
Texas V. Brown, 460 u.s. no (1988).
!d.
104.
105.
These are only a few of the factors that the officers in charge of the
program stated could be used at the checkpoint to detain a motorist. Respondent's
Brief at 88, Michigan Dep't State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (No. 88-1897).
106.
!d. at 85.
107.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979).
108.
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checkpoints are usually a total surprise to drivers, despite
the advanced publicity. 109 Second, the fear factor is heightened by the presence of a large number of officers, chemical
testing equipment, and mobile booking and jail vans. 110
This is an unsettling use of authority even to an innocent
driver. Even if the driver knows the location of the checkpoint, because of officer discretion, the possibility of prolonged questioning-even when innocent-is troubling.

2.

Comparison of Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte

Because the checkpoints in Sitz do not resemble the
checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court had to structure
the Brown test to meet its needs.
a. Permanent v. temporary. In Martinez-Fuerte, the
Court limited its holding to "the types of stops described in
the opinion, permanent checkpoints. '[A]ny further detention . . . must be based on consent or probable cause."' 111
The Court had good reason to limit the holding to only
permanent checkpoints.
(1) Notice and surprise. Most of the stops at permanent checkpoints take place during the day, whereas
sobriety checkpoints are almost always operated at night.
Surprise is the key to a sobriety checkpoint, 112 whereas
the permanent checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte was to provide
an obstacle to using the main highways to ferret illegal
aliens into the United States. 113 A seizure followed by an
interrogation and even a cursory search at night is more
intrusive and offensive than a daytime stop that is almost
as routine as going through a toll gate or the fruit
checkpoints in California. The motorist knows that the checkpoint is there, what to expect at the checkpoint, and what
to do at the checkpoint.

109.
The guidelines only provide for notice of the target county, not the road
that the checkpoint will be placed on. Also, one-half of the people further detained
by the checkpoints are innocent. These two factors provide the driver with an
unsettled feeling upon the sudden appearance of the checkpoint.
110.
Respondent's Brief at as, Sitz (No. 88-1897).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 54a, 567 (1976).
111.
The surprise occurs because the driver has no knowledge of the location of
112.
the checkpoint or what to expect. In Michigan, publicity only revealed the targeted
county. The publicity did not reveal the road upon which the checkpoint would be
located.
11:1.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557.
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Unannounced, investigatory seizures, particularly at
night, are typical of governments far different from our democracy. Justice Jackson, soon after returning from the
Nuremberg Trials in France, stated:
These [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not
mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among the deprivation of rights,
none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the
spirit of the individual, and putting terror in every heart.
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and
most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government. 114

than

(2) Immigration checkpoints are more necessary
sobriety checkpoints. Immigration checkpoints are

necessary to discover illegal aliens. 115 Smuggling illegal
aliens does not impair the motorist's driving ability, but if a
motorist is intoxicated his driving ability will be impaired.116 An intoxicated motorist can often be identified
by his driving maneuvers, 117 whereas a motorist carrying
illegal aliens most likely cannot be spotted by observing
driving patterns. A checkpoint is needed because of the lack
of alternatives in spotting motorist smuggling illegal aliens.
Alcohol related fatalities are more susceptible to reduction by public information campaigns than are crimes such
as smuggling or armed robbery. An intoxicated individual is
his own worst enemy. As mentioned earlier, the majority of
fatalities are the intoxicated drivers themselves. If the risk
of serious personal injury to the body does not deter the

114.
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, ??? n.9. (quoting
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 278-274 (1973) (quoting Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
115.
Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in the United States vary
widely. In 1972, conservative estimates put the figure at 1 million and two years
later the estimate was revised upward to around 12 million aliens illegally in the
United States. Eighty-five percent of the illegal aliens in the United States are
from Mexico. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 8n, H78-79 (1974). The
number of illegal aliens continues to grow and strain resources needed in detecting
them.
116.
If a motorist's intoxication did not significantly impair his driving ability, it
would not he illegal.
117.
Witnesses from the Michigan State Police testified that officers receive substantial training on how to identify drunk drivers and are very skillful in detecting
and arresting the drivers. Respondent's Brief at ::!0, Michigan Dep't State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (No. H8-1897).
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drivers, then it is doubtful that checkpoints will be much of
a deterrence.
In Martinez-Fuerte, the checkpoints were designed to
prevent inland movement. 118 The checkpoints do succeed in
apprehending some illegal immigrants and smugglers, but
they also deter movement of others by threatening apprehension and increasing the costs of illegal transportation.
Thus, besides the arrests, the checkpoints act as a deterrent
because of increased costs of transportation. Checkpoints
used to detect drunk drivers do not have any long lived
deterrent effect. 119
b. More like a roving patrol. The sobriety checkpoint
more closely resembles the roving patrols that required
reasonable suspicion. A motorist with advanced notice of the
location of a permanent checkpoint has the opportunity to
avoid the search entirely, or at least prepare for the search
and limit its intrusion upon the motorist's privacy. The
sobriety checkpoints can be placed anywhere the state police
deem a need exists to try to curb drunk drivers. The possibility exists that they can be placed anywhere on state
roads just as a roving patrol could go anywhere on the
state's roads; whereas, permanent checkpoints are always in
the same place year after year. Checkpoints, despite their
advanced publicity, are usually a total surprise to drivers.
The physical and psychological intrusion visited upon
motorists by a random stop by a roving patrol or a temporary checkpoint are no different. Both types of stops interfere with freedom of movement, are inconvenient, and consume time. Furthermore, both create substantial anxiety
because neither are expected. The State of Michigan could
announce that it was allowing roving patrol stops which is
the same as announcing sobriety checkpoints, but still the
Court would most likely find roving patrols unconstitutional.

3. Discretion
There is a great difference between the kind of discre-

118.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 878, 879 (1975) (referring to
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
119.
As drivers realize that there is very little chance of being caught, they will
not be deterred from drinking and driving. Much of the program's deterrence is associated with the attention the media gives the program. As the media's interest
wanes, as it always does, the program's deterrent effect will also decline.
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tion an officer can exercise at an immigration checkpoint
and the kind of discretion exercised at a sobriety checkpoint.
Questions at an immigration checkpoint are for identification
papers or driver's license. At a sobriety checkpoint, the officer has unlimited discretion in the type of questions that he
can ask. Answers to those questions determine whether or
not the motorist is subject to further examination and interrogation at the second stop.
The state's law enforcement officers also have considerable discretion in selecting a location for temporary
checkpoints. This discretion allows states to also check for
other illegal acts under the guise of a sobriety checkpoint.
Thus, the officers are able to bypass other protections provided to individuals.

4. No hinderance to law enforcement if decided the other
way
The 1985 task-force set forth thirty-five alternatives for
combating alcohol related traffic accidents. 120 Sobriety
checkpoints are only one of the alternatives suggested by
the task force. The record in Sitz never mentions whether
any of the other alternatives were even considered or implemented. By declaring sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional,
the Court would in no way hinder law enforcement efforts
in deterring drunk drivers because other measures would be
more effective. As was mentioned earlier, patrol cars result
in more arrests and are also more efficient in deterring
drunk driving. 121 The Court overvalues
the law
enforcement's interest by granting the professional politician
complete discretion concerning how much of an intrusion is
allowed by the programs it picks.

5. The checkpoint was more like a publicity stunt by state
officials
The State of Michigan believed that one of the crowning
achievements of the program was the media attention that
120.
Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
121.
See Respondent's Brief at ao, Michigan Dep't State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990) (No. 88-1897) (indicating that officers are highly trained and very
skillful in detecting and arresting drunk drivers); Sitz, 429 N.W.2d at 184 (indicating that a number of Michigan county sheriffs testified that patrol cars are more
effective at utilizing police resources to combat drunk driving).
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sobriety checkpoints received. Lieutenant Cotton of the Maryland State Police testified that the media coverage is overwhelming. 122 Is this a justification for allowing an intrusion upon the rights of individuals? The words of Justice
Scalia should be quickly remembered:
The only plausible explanation, in my view, is what
the Commissioner himself offered in the concluding sentence of his memorandum to Custom Service employees
announcing the drug program: "implementation of the drug
screening program would set an important example in our
country's struggle with its most serious threat to our national health and security." What better way to show that
the Government is serious about its "war on drugs" than
to subject its employees on the front line of the war to
this invasion of their privacy and affront to their dignity.
To be sure, there is only a slight chance that it will prevent some serious public harm resulting from Service employee drug use, but will show to the world that the Service is "clean," and-most important of all-will demonstrate the determination of the Government to eliminate
this scourge of our society! I think it is obvious that this
justification is unacceptable; that the impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point;
that symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as
the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search. 123

While the fight against drunk driving is laudable, the
effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints is questionable. There is
only a slight chance that sobriety checkpoints will prevent
some serious public harm. The only justifiable reason for
the program is the attention that the media is giving to the
program which serves to show the public and the world that
Michigan is concerned about drunk driving. What Michigan
does not say is that sobriety checkpoints deprive individuals
of their right against unreasonable searches. All this effort
so that the government can be viewed as leading the crusade against drunk drivers. This case is driven by nothing
more than a symbolic government action-an insufficient
justification for invasion into the private rights of others.

122.
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, ??? n.19 (1990).
128.
!d. (quoting Scalia, J., dissenting, Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 705 (1989)).
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CONCLUSION

While the Court's, along with Michigan's, desire 124 to
make roads safer is praiseworthy, the Court has failed to
follow its analysis announced in earlier decisions. The Court
undermined the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals by
concentrating only on the initial stop and failing to consider
subsequent intrusions. Fourth Amendment rights, in this
decision, appear to have become second class rights. The
Fourth Amendment was designed to grant an individual a
zone of privacy which could only be breached when the
reasonable requirements of probable cause were met. Only
in special circumstances, when the intrusion serves special
government needs beyond the normal needs of law enforcement, does the probable cause standard give way to the
balancing test of Brown. No special circumstances have
arisen in regard to drunk driving which normal law enforcement cannot solve.
Instead, the Court, aroused by fears (perhaps even supported by the majority of citizens) of destruction on the
highways, virtually eliminated the second prong: the degree
to which the seizure advances the public interest, which
provides a check against inefficient law enforcement techniques. The result is a deprivation of an indispensable right
for a program that does not obtain, nor will obtain even its
stated objective.

B. Gordon Beckstead

124.
"For decades, this Court has 'repeatedly lamented the tragedy."' !d. at 24R6
(quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983)). See also, Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) ("The increasing slaughter on our highways ...
now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield.").

